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Executive Summary 
• Geography plays an important role in strategic culture, by placing enduring objective 
constraints on military and defense policy and influencing the way that political and military 
elites view the world.  
• Although Western attention has been focused on Russian activity in the Baltic region and 
Eastern Europe, Russian strategy has been more preoccupied with the geography of Russia’s 
southern border. An important role in this southern strategy is played by Russia’s three 
southern seas—the Caspian, Azov, and Black seas—as interconnected maritime platforms for 
Russia’s wider power projection.  
• Russia has demonstrated its ideal mode of maritime control through the formation in the 
Caspian Sea of a form of mare clausum—a regime that restricts access for third parties to the 
sea and de facto permits domination by the Russian navy. A similar consolidation of Russian 
control is under way in the Sea of Azov.  
• Russia’s annexation of Crimea and modernization of the Black Sea Fleet have transformed 
its strategic position in the Black Sea. Russia’s attempts to achieve geopolitical dominance of 
the Black Sea will continue to cause serious tensions with Ukraine and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Geography and Strategic Culture 
Geography is back in fashion in Russia. The  Board of Trustees of the Russian Geographic 
Society (RGO)  is a guide to the most powerful business leaders and officials in Russia today, 
from Rosneft Chair Igor Sechin to Head of the Presidential Administration Anton Vaino. The  
RGO’s president is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, while the chairman of the Board of Trustees 
is Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, who makes a point of addressing the RGO at least 
once a year.1  
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Putin has frequently promoted geography teaching in schools, claiming that the subject “serves 
as the basis for forming patriotic values, cultural and national identity and self-consciousness.”2 
This interest in geography, of course, is not simply academic but demonstrates how important 
geography has been in shaping Russia’s strategic culture.3 Russia’s leaders like to think spatially, 
articulating new geographical visions that extend beyond Russia’s borders—geopolitical 
imaginaries like a “Russian World,” a “Pivot to the East,” or a “Greater Eurasia Partnership.”4 
Western attention has long been focused on a Russian threat to the Baltics and Eastern Europe, 
but it is along Russia’s southern flank—in a long arc from the North Caucasus to Ukraine—that 
Russian military campaigns and burgeoning naval power are redrawing maps and reviving 
imperial geographies.  
Over more than three centuries, Russian strategic culture was shaped by the expansion of 
Russian influence toward its three southern waters: the Caspian, Azov, and Black seas. The three 
seas served as critical strategic routes for Russian—and later Soviet—power projection into the 
Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Middle East while also acting as “maritime forward 
defensive zones,” effectively buffer zones helping to protect Russia’s frontiers.5 Russian 
strategic culture has been shaped by the importance of maintaining access to warm-water sea 
ports in the Black Sea, access to the world ocean through the Turkish Straits, and the use of the 
Black and Caspian seas as channels for military and political access to the Middle East. 
Russia’s strategic retreat after the collapse of the Soviet Union suddenly opened up its southern 
seas to geopolitical competition. The Caspian—a quiet Cold War backwater—emerged as a new 
geopolitical hot spot in the 1990s, as Western oil companies and the newly independent littoral 
states—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan—vied for control over oil and gas resources. 
In the Black Sea, an independent Ukraine gained sovereignty over Crimea, leaving Russia’s 
naval base at Sevastopol existing on a precarious lease. Turkey’s navy filled the vacuum left by 
the decline of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Russia retreated from a wider naval role: Russian vessels 
largely disappeared from the Eastern Mediterranean for two decades after the Soviet 5th 
Operational Squadron was disbanded in 1992.   
Now Russia is back, with a modernized navy, an ambitious maritime strategy, and a new 
commitment to project its influence across a wider region to the south, including the Middle East 
and the Mediterranean. Putin, born and raised in the northern capital of St. Petersburg, has made 
the Black Sea resort of Sochi almost the second capital of Russia. From his lavish palace in Sochi, 
he presides over a new sphere of influence in which the three southern seas play vital roles.  
                                                          
2 “Putin poruchil sozdat' atlas mira bez iskazheniya «geograficheskoi pravdy,” RBK, April 27, 2018,  
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Caspian Sea 
The Caspian has played a vital strategic role for Russia since the time of Peter the Great, who 
founded the Caspian flotilla in 1722 for a campaign against the Persian Empire. At the Treaty of 
Gulistan in 1813, Russia gained the exclusive right to maintain a navy on the sea, a tradition of 
naval dominance of the Caspian that lasted into the 20th century and is now being revived. 
Although other littoral states have begun to build up naval forces, they are outgunned by Russia, 
which has extensively modernized the Caspian flotilla since the early 2000s, with two new 
Gepard-class frigates entering service in 2012 and six modern corvettes, several of them 
equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles. To support the flotilla, the Russian defense ministry is 
completing a new naval base at Kaspiisk to replace the existing base in Astrakhan, which has 
always been limited by climatic conditions—the northern Caspian freezes in winter.6 
The Caspian flotilla was previously viewed as having only local military significance, but on 
October 7, 2015, four Russian ships—including three smaller Buyan-M corvettes—launched 26 
Kalibr cruise missiles at targets in Syria, more than 1,000 miles away. This was a spectacular 
reminder of how the Caspian could be used to project Russian power across a wide swath of the 
Middle East. Plans are in place to increase the Kalibr missile’s range significantly, ensuring that 
the Caspian flotilla can support military campaigns almost anywhere in the Middle East.7 
According to Admiral Igor Kasatonov, a former Black Sea fleet commander, “the Caspian 
flotilla is important for Russia from both a geopolitical and a military-strategic point of view. … 
Despite the fact that the Caspian is a closed sea, [the flotilla] is able to carry out strategic tasks in 
conflicts such as Syria.”8  
Russia has accompanied its military build-up with diplomatic breakthroughs. For two decades, 
littoral states disputed the Caspian’s legal status, but a compromise was finally reached in 
August 2018, when all the states signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. 
In an important strategic gain for Russia, the Convention committed littoral states to “ensuring 
security and stability in the Caspian Sea region,” through the “non-presence in the Caspian Sea 
of armed forces not belonging to the Parties,” and the “non-provision by a Party of its territory to 
other States to commit aggression and undertake other military actions against any Party.” 
Article 11 of the Convention restricts “navigation in, entry to and exit from the Caspian Sea 
exclusively” to “ships flying the flag of one of the Parties.”9 The agreement was an important 
strategic advancement for Russia, which thereby enhanced its military domination of the sea, at 
the expense of Iran and other littoral states. This model of a mare claustrum—a sea closed to 
foreign shipping—had long been the historical reality in the Caspian but was now enforced by 
legal and diplomatic agreement, which also extended the principle of exclusion of foreign 
military assets to the territory of all the littoral states. This idea of a space that excluded the West 
                                                          
6 “Kaspiyskoi flotilii postroyat novuyu bazu,” Izvestiya, October 2, 2017, https://iz.ru/650649/nikolai-surkov-
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and assured a dominant role for Russia has gained much wider resonance in Russian thinking, 
even in the much more contested waters of the Black Sea.  
The Volga-Don Canal and the Eurasia Canal 
The Caspian Sea is a geographic anomaly. Fed by the waters of the Volga River basin, it has no 
outlet—its waters slowly evaporate in the stark heat of Central Asia’s deserts. For centuries, the 
only link to the oceans was via a laborious land porterage between the Don and Volga rivers to 
enable vessels to reach the Black Sea. With the opening of the Volga-Don canal in 1952, the two 
seas were finally connected, and Russian vessels could navigate the long route up the Volga 
River, along the canal and down the Don River into the Sea of Azov. This link is part of Russia’s 
extensive inland waterways, the Unified Deep Water System of European Russia, which 
connects the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas.  
The strategic utility of this route was demonstrated in May 2018 when three Russian missile 
ships redeployed from the Caspian to Rostov-on-Don, on the Sea of Azov.10 In June 2018, two 
corvettes, the Grad Sviyazhsk and Veliky Ustyug, also sailed along this route from the Caspian 
to the Sea of Azov, and on through the Kerch Straits and the Bosphorus and into the Eastern 
Mediterranean.11 
This route is too shallow for larger military craft, and the 13 locks on the Volga-Don Canal make 
it a time-consuming journey. The Soviets began building an alternative canal route from the 
Caspian to the Black Sea in the 1980s, but it was never completed. In 2007, President Putin 
promoted the idea of a direct canal between the Caspian and the Azov seas, commenting that 
such a canal “would … give Caspian Sea countries access to the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean, that is to the World Ocean. […] This qualitatively changes their geopolitical 
status and allows them to become maritime powers.”12  
This project—often dubbed the Eurasia Canal—would run 650–700 kilometers directly from the 
Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, probably using some existing waterways and reservoirs.13 The 
project has lacked financial backing and also faced environmental concerns.14 Nevertheless, 
Chinese interest in a trans-Caspian route to compete with the land and sea route that transits 
Georgia and Azerbaijan may make the route economically viable. At a Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) summit in Sochi on May 14, 2018, President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan 
sought to revive the Eurasia Canal project, which would—he claimed– transform Kazakhstan 
into a maritime power.15 The Russian Ministry of Defense also reportedly supports the project, 
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in light of the increasing security links between the Caspian and Russia’s wider maritime 
strategy in the Azov and Black seas.16 
Sea of Azov 
Emerging from the mouth of the Don River, Russian warships transiting from the Caspian enter 
the Sea of Azov, a body of water legally shared by Ukraine and Russia according to a 2003 
agreement. Although the international community began paying attention to the conflict around 
the Sea of Azov only after 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, Russia had been seeking to gain 
more control over the sea since at least 2003, when the two sides were involved in a dispute over 
the ownership of Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait. A 2003 agreement—the Treaty on Cooperation 
in the Use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait—was skewed in Russia’s favor, because it 
confirmed Russia’s contention that Azov was an internal sea of Russia and Ukraine and was 
effectively closed to third countries, but the agreement left many key issues unresolved.17 
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Sea of Azov has become strategically critical for 
Russia because it could be used to isolate the Crimean peninsula from the Russian mainland in 
case of military conflict; in response, the Russian navy has rapidly built up its naval capacity in 
Rostov-on-Don, and Russia has built new infrastructure, above all the Crimean Bridge, a $6 
billion road and rail link between Crimea and the Russian mainland.18 The bridge has effectively 
transformed the geography of the sea by consolidating Russian control over both the Kerch Strait 
and consequently the Sea of Azov and provoking numerous incidents between Russian and 
Ukrainian ships.  
A dangerous clash in November 2018 between Russian and Ukrainian naval vessels resulted in 
Russian forces firing on Ukrainian ships in international waters and detaining 24 sailors.19 Since 
then, although the political rhetoric has remained confrontational, Russia and Ukraine have 
avoided further incidents. In late February 2019, the two sides even signed a protocol on fishing 
in the Sea of Azov, committing themselves to an agreed division of fishing quota while also 
agreeing not to seize each other’s ships.20 But Azov remains a hot spot for potentially dangerous 
clashes in the future: Moscow rejected proposals to extend the mandate of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe’s monitoring mission in Donbas to the Sea of Azov and the 
Kerch Strait.21 Russia continues a military build-up in the Sea of Azov and will maintain its 
unilateral regulation of the Kerch Strait, which was highlighted as a key goal in Russia’s 2015 
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17 Ridvan Bari Urcosta, “Russia’s Strategic Considerations on the Sea of Azov,” Warsaw Institute, March 12, 2018. 
18 Urcosta, “Russia’s Strategic Considerations.”  
19 “Russia Fires On and Seizes Ukrainian Ships Near Annexed Crimea,” Reuters, November 25, 2018, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia/russia-fires-on-and-seizes-ukrainian-ships-near-annexed-
crimea-idUKKCN1NU0DY. 
20 Ivan Schwartz, “Moskva i Kiev podelili rybu v Azovskom more,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 28, 2019, 
http://www.ng.ru/economics/2019-02-28/4_7521_azov.html. 
21 Tatyana Ivzhenko, “Kiev mozhet dat’ prikaz na ‘kerchenskiy proryv,’” Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 17, 2019, 
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2019-02-17/1_7510_kiev.html. 
 
 
Maritime Doctrine. Consequently, the Sea of Azov is rapidly also becoming a closed sea, 
dominated by the Russian navy, with Ukraine’s use of its waters effectively regulated by Russia.  
Black Sea  
The annexation of Crimea transformed Russia’s previously weak strategic position in the Black 
Sea. It ended the restrictions imposed by Ukraine on modernization of the Black Sea Fleet and 
the fleet’s main harbor at Sevastopol. It ensured Russian de facto control over the Kerch Strait 
and, consequently, the Sea of Azov and it expanded Russia’s de facto shoreline on the Black Sea 
from 421 kilometers to 1,200 kilometers, adding almost 500 kilometers of coastline in the Azov 
Sea.22 Although these territorial annexations are not recognized in international law, Russia has 
swiftly moved to consolidate control through a militarization of the Crimean peninsula and a 
buildup of its Black Sea Fleet.  
The Black Sea Fleet was founded in 1784 as the “guarantor of the security of the southern 
borders of the Fatherland,” but it could hardly fulfill that role in the early 21st century after years 
of neglect by a cash-strapped Russian state. Before the 2010s, Turkey, not Russia, had the largest 
fleet in the sea, boasting 14 submarines to Russia’s one and a combined tonnage of 97,000, 
compared with 63,000 for the Black Sea Fleet.23 In 2010, however, Russia announced a complete 
overhaul of the fleet, adding six new submarines and modernized warships. Russia has also built 
up its defense of the Crimean peninsula, including an expanded Sevastopol naval base, a new 
military garrison, an aviation division, sophisticated radar systems, and three divisions of coastal 
missile anti-air and anti-ship missile systems.24 According to Russian Minister of Defense 
Shoygu, “a unique multi-purpose military unit has been created in the peninsula and it is 
constantly being strengthened. Its modern high-tech weapon systems do not leave a single 
chance to a potential enemy who dares to attack this primordially Russian territory.”25 
This military buildup all adds up to what analyst Michael Peterson calls a “counter-navy,” which 
provides Russia with sufficient land-based military installations, together with anti-air and anti-
surface missile defenses and fighter aircraft, to dominate much of the Black Sea area.26 
According to Peterson, “if Gerasimov was correct in 2016 that Turkey once had the region’s 
dominant navy, then that navy, even with U.S. help, would face a monumentally difficult task in 
taking on Russia in the Black Sea in 2018.”27  
Admiral Vladimir Komoyedov, the head of the Russian State Duma Committee for Defense, said 
in 2016 that the Black Sea “became the Russian Sea in the ninth century and practically 
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remained as such until 1991.”28 However historically inaccurate, this nationalist view of Russia’s 
southern geography supports Moscow’s view that the Black Sea falls within its rightful sphere of 
influence and that the Black Sea is the “zone of responsibility of [the] Russian Black Sea 
Fleet.”29 Consequently, the Black Sea is now an area of potential confrontation between NATO 
vessels (particularly from the United States and United Kingdom) that are exercising freedom of 
navigation rights in the sea and Russia, which continues to seek its ultimate goal of turning the 
Black Sea—like the Caspian and Azov seas—into a closed sea, from which foreign vessels 
would be excluded. Officially, Russia strongly supports the 1936 Montreux Convention, which 
permits smaller warships from non–Black Sea nations to visit the sea for up to 21 days and 
allows Russia largely unimpeded access to the Mediterranean. Unofficially, some experts have 
called for Montreux to be revised to prevent U.S. and British naval vessels from entering the 
Black Sea.30 
Conclusion 
Russian strategic shifts are often articulated through new geographical visions. Since 2003, one 
of the most important shifts in geopolitical thinking in Moscow has been a reorientation of 
Russia’s strategic focus to its southern flank. The southern strategy has relied heavily on a new 
maritime strategy, implemented across the three seas of Russia’s south —the Caspian, Azov, and 
Black seas. As with other Russian strategic shifts, the geopolitical shifts in the south reflect both 
contemporary challenges and long-standing historical dynamics that are embedded in Russia’s 
strategic culture, including the importance of access to warm-water ports, and Russia’s historical 
insistence on a right of access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits. These historical 
factors are compounded by Russia’s revived influence in the Mediterranean, prompted by its 
military intervention in Syria, but also reflected in Russian involvement in the Libyan conflict, 
and in other areas of the Middle East and North Africa. As Russia expands its influence in 
Central Asia and the Middle East, the three seas are becoming a vital, interlinked military-
security zone for Russia and a region of significant challenge for NATO and the West. 
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